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Abstract 
The Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) was designed as a civil/criminal hybrid, 
preventive in structure and with a largely undefined object. After 2002, legal challenges to 
the ASBO led to the use of justificatory arguments from cumulative effect, and to the 
introduction of new measures which offered to regulate anti-social behaviour in more 
legally-acceptable forms. In 2014 the Coalition government replaced the ASBO with two 
new instruments: a post-conviction Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO) and a wholly-civil anti-
social behaviour injunction (ASB Injunction). While the CBO and the ASB Injunction build 
on this history, it is argued that they do not represent a new approach to anti-social behaviour 
so much as a continuation of the ASBO by other means. 
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In creating the ASBO, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 empowered a magistrate to impose a 
range of prohibitions, requested by a police officer or local authority representative, on an 
individual who had engaged in an undefined range of behaviours which had either caused or 
had the potential to cause offence. These prohibitions did not address the offending behaviour 
directly but were designed to prevent the opportunity for offensive behaviour from arising. 
Any breach of the prohibitions was a criminal offence, potentially attracting a substantial 
custodial sentence, irrespective of whether the offensive behaviour itself had been repeated. 
These three characteristics - the undefined nature of anti-social behaviour; the combination of 
civil and criminal law used to address it; the preventive regulatory structure of the ASBO; 
were novel individually; taken together they presented legal and logical challenges, whose 
working-out dominates the history of the ASBO. 
 
The undefined nature of anti-social behaviour, firstly, was emphasised in parliamentary 
debates on what would be the Crime and Disorder Act 1998: Home Office minister Alun 
Michael insisted on a loose definition, arguing that ‘[a] narrower formulation would permit 
the defendant to circumvent the order by subtly changing the anti-social activity in 
question’.1 Under the terms of the Act, an ASBO could be applied for on the grounds that the 
recipient had acted ‘in an anti-social manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was 
likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same 
household as himself’.2 The phrasing echoed both the Public Order Act 1986 offence of 
‘harassment, alarm or distress’ and the phrasing of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 
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which specified that ‘harassing’ a person covered ‘alarming the person or causing the person 
distress’.3 In all other respects the behaviour concerned was undefined: any activity could be 
classified as anti-social on the basis of its effects on a given occasion.  
 
This refusal of specificity is supported by multiple omissions. There was no requirement that 
the behaviour must have been engaged in either intentionally or recklessly. Moreover, the 
legislation specifically covered actions which were not claimed to have caused harassment, 
alarm or distress, but only to be likely to have this effect. The legislation thus gave a 
privileged status, not merely to the subjective experience of harassment, alarm and distress, 
but also to official judgments of likely effect. The only substantive limit on the implicit 
definition of anti-social behaviour was provided by the stipulation that the acts involved must 
be unreasonable: in determining whether anti-social behaviour has taken place, ‘the court 
shall disregard any act of the defendant which he shows was reasonable in the 
circumstances’.4 This could have little if any protective value for defendants: an individual 
who had inadvertently caused offence would face the more demanding test of persuading the 
court that the action causing the offence was itself ‘reasonable’. In parliamentary debate, 
Michael stressed this point explicitly: ‘if an individual who is habitally drunk or on drugs or 
who simply does not care can plead that his behaviour was reasonable in the circumstances, 
an order cannot be made. If it is not reasonable in the circumstances, it is exactly the kind of 
behaviour that needs to be dealt with and prevented in the future.’5  
 
The hybrid structure of the ASBO, secondly, meant that claims of anti-social behaviour 
leading to the imposition of an ASBO needed only to meet the civil standard of proof, while 
the breach of the ASBO would be a criminal offence. While the breach was to be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt, what had to be proved at this stage was not that anti-social 
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behaviour had taken place, but only that one or more of the prohibitions imposed by the 
ASBO had been breached. Since these prohibitions were designed to forestall anti-social 
behaviour, the prohibited activities might be considerably more broadly defined - and easier 
to prove - than the objectionable behaviour itself. In short, the hybrid nature of the ASBO 
made it difficult to challenge assertions that anti-social behaviour had taken place when 
applying for an ASBO, and easy to prove that the conditions of the ASBO had been 
breached. This approach was justified in terms of the need to assert the authority of the courts 
and the government: in Michael’s words, ‘the Government want to send the clear message 
that people should not mess with the courts when the courts have imposed anti-social 
behaviour orders’.6 This argument suggests that the criminal penalty imposed for breach of 
an ASBO was envisaged as punishing the offender’s defiance of the court and the authority 
by which the ASBO had been imposed - and as deterring others from similar defiance. 
 
As a preventive measure, lastly, an ASBO would typically contain prohibitions targeting 
legal and innocuous activities; these would be criminalised for the ASBO recipient, not 
because they were themselves anti-social but because they had been judged to be precursors 
to anti-social behaviour, in the case of that individual. As the Court of Appeal commented in 
Boness, ‘The aim of an ASBO is to prevent anti-social behaviour. To prevent it the police or 
other authorities need to be able to take action before the anti-social behaviour it is designed 
to prevent takes place.’7 The scope of the ASBO was also left undefined, but for a double 
invocation of necessity: if an order was necessary in order to protect others from the effects 
of an individual’s anti-social behaviour, then the court could impose any prohibitions which 
were necessary to do so. This is the logic of ‘pre-crime’, aiming to ‘anticipate and forestall 
that which has not yet occurred’.8 The conjunction of this preventive logic with the undefined 
nature of anti-social behaviour made the ASBO unusually powerful and flexible. Zedner 
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argues that the over-arching goal of the pre-crime mentality is the ‘pursuit of security’ - 
where security can be considered ‘the indefinite pursuit of the unattainable’.9 The open 
texture of the concept of anti-social behaviour makes security in this context an especially 
elusive target. In the context of political appeals to security, this elusiveness could make 
partial successes, and the tools which made them possible, seem particularly valuable. 
  
The ASBO as passed into law was thus an all-purpose mechanism for imposing a tailored 
regime of behavioural regulation on any individual whose past activity had been identified as 
problematic. The anti-social nature of a particular action was given partly by its effects 
(actual or potential) and partly by its ‘reasonableness’, as judged by the police and courts. 
Where actions were ‘reasonable’ an ASBO could not be obtained, even if alarm or distress 
had demonstrably been caused. Where actions were ‘unreasonable’, alarm or distress could 
be assumed to have been ‘likely’. 
 
The ASBO and the courts 
 
The ASBO became available in April 1999. Initial takeup was slow and geographically 
patchy: by the end of 2001 a total of 518 applications had been made, to the disappointment 
of government ministers, who had envisaged up to 5,000 applications annually.10 Following 
the General Election of 2002, the government put forward a policy agenda focusing on 
‘respect’.11 The poorest in society would be offered new opportunities through public sector 
reforms, but these would be conditional on a revival of reciprocity and mutual respect.12 This 
conditionality would be enforced through the criminal justice and welfare systems, with the 
ASBO a key instrument for modifying disrespectful behaviour; a Home Office campaign 
against anti-social behaviour launched in 2003 took ‘Respect’ as its title.  
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Between 2002 and 2006, two main trends are visible in the development of the ASBO: trends 
which embody contradictions both within and between themselves. On one hand, the 
‘Respect’ agenda marked a concerted drive by the Home Office to expand the use of the 
ASBO. For practical purposes, this entailed addressing the lack of definition of anti-social 
behaviour, clarifying and making explicit the working definitions of anti-social behaviour 
used by practitioners. This trend towards explicit definition was accompanied, and to some 
extent undercut, by a stress on the protean nature of anti-social behaviour and the need for an 
instrument with the flexibility and lack of definition offered by the ASBO, in order to prevent 
it taking place in any form. 
 
At the same time, the hybridity of the ASBO was increasingly coming into question; the 
courts were not satisfied with Jack Straw’s confident assertion that the ASBO combined ‘the 
best of civil and of criminal law’.13 These concerns culminated in the 2002 McCann 
judgment, which drove a wedge between the ASBO’s civil and criminal elements; the courts’ 
response to McCann, however, evinced a continuing commitment to the ASBO as a criminal 
as well as a civil instrument. The contradictions posed by both these trends - one pushing for 
the ASBO to be used more freely to address a narrower range of behaviour; one placing 
limits on the ASBO but searching for ways to circumvent them - were both partially and 
unsatisfactorily resolved by appeals to cumulative effect. A longer-term solution was the 
introduction in 2003 of the Anti-social Behaviour Injunction (ASBI): an instrument which 
avoids many of the problematic elements of the ASBO. 
 
In 2003, as a curtain-raiser for the Respect initiative, the Home Office carried out the 
Anti-Social Behaviour Day Count. This effectively put the issue of anti-social behaviour on 
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the news agenda, not least by assigning it an estimated annual cost of over £2 billion. The 
Day Count was noteworthy for using a uniform survey frame: participants representing 
agencies responsible for dealing with anti-social behaviour were asked to tally occurrences of 
a list of specified behaviours, itself derived from Home Office focus group research. The list 
used by the Day Count is strikingly miscellaneous: both serious and trivial criminal offences 
appear alongside legal but heavily policed behaviours such as prostitution and begging, as 
well as entirely legal activities with the potential to cause annoyance (e.g. ‘rowdy 
behaviour’).14 However, the heterogeneity of its key measurable makes the intervention 
represented by the Day Count more rather than less significant. However arbitrary it might 
seem to add incidents of stalking, begging, litter and children riding bicycles on the pavement 
into a single total, the classification of these and many other activities as ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ reflected a growing consensus among practitioners as to how anti-social 
behaviour should be defined - and the population groups most likely to carry it out. It also 
signalled the confidence that any single incident of anti-social behaviour, however trivial, 
could be seen as a local manifestation of a single, serious problem - and one which could be 
addressed through ‘discipline, regulation and punishment’.15 
 
A significant court ruling in 2003 showed a similar confidence in official ability to identify 
anti-social behaviour, irrespective of the effect which any specific incident had or did not 
have on any identifiable individual. In the case of Chief Constable of Lancashire v Potter, the 
Appeal Court held that the defendant’s behaviour (the lawful activity of soliciting for 
prostitution in the street) could validly be described as anti-social on the grounds that she was 
working in a residential area where several other sex workers were also active: ‘the 
cumulative effect of street prostitutes operating in residential areas would, as a matter of 
common sense, have caused or have been likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to at 
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least some of the broad range of residents of and visitors to those areas’.16 An activity carried 
out by one individual on one occasion could be taken to constitute anti-social behaviour on 
the basis of offence which was assumed to have been caused, not by the actions of the 
individual herself but as the cumulative effect of other similar actions carried out by other 
people; moreover, this offence is assumed to have been caused to ‘at least some’ unidentified 
individuals living in or passing through the area. 
 
Ideas of cumulative effect had featured strongly in early discussions of anti-social 
behaviour.17 It had been argued that anti-social behaviour might be considered as a ‘chronic 
crime’, in which a series of individually trivial incidents could be treated as amounting to a 
single offence on the basis of their cumulative effect. While this model had had no place in 
the legislative definition of anti-social behaviour - which allowed for a single action to be 
considered anti-social - the rhetoric of cumulative effect continued to be used to justify a 
draconian response to individually trivial actions. Thus the Labour MP Frank Field argued in 
2003 that ‘the distinguishing mark of ASB is that each single instance does not by itself 
warrant a counter legal challenge. It is in its regularity that ASB wields its destructive 
force’.18 The Potter ruling suggests an appeal to cumulative effect in a new form, allowing a 
single incident to be classed as offensive on the grounds of the cumulative effect of other 
similar incidents which are arbitrarily grouped together with it. The result is to extend the 
logic of cumulative effect across the whole of an identifiable social group, making it possible 
to impose regulatory measures on an individual member of the group on the basis of the 
offence which might be assumed to have been caused, to other unidentified individuals, by 
the cumulative effect of their activities. The anti-social effect justifying the regulation of a 
particular individual is the cumulative effect which the activities of that individual’s social 
group generally tend to have on the public. The implicit definition of anti-social behaviour is 
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both broadened and narrowed: any activity can qualify as anti-social, as long as the person 
carrying it out is a member of a group whose activities (‘as a matter of common sense’) are 
likely to cause offence.  
 
While these developments tended to broaden the scope of the ASBO and erode safeguards 
against its misuse, concerns about the civil/criminal hybridity of the ASBO were growing. In 
2002 the House of Lords judgment in McCann19 ruled that, despite the civil nature of the 
ASBO itself, the imposition of criminal penalties for breach made the civil standard of proof 
inappropriate in hearing ASBO applications; instead, ‘the heightened civil standard of proof, 
indistinguishable from the criminal standard of proof’ should be applied.20 The judgment also 
emphasised the civil classification of proceedings for the imposition of an ASBO. This 
entailed that evidence brought forward when an ASBO is applied for would not be used in 
any (criminal) prosecution for the breach of the ASBO: if the defendant was found guilty of 
breaching an ASBO, sentence should be passed on the basis of the breach itself and the 
actions leading up to it, rather than reflecting the pattern of behaviour leading up to the 
original imposition of the ASBO.21 
 
The formal divorce of the breach from the behaviour which had led to the imposition of the 
ASBO created serious difficulties in justifying sentences for the breach of an ASBO. If the 
actions leading up to the breach had not involved the commission of an offence, criminal 
punishment for those actions would be inappropriate; if an offence had been committed, on 
the other hand, that offence would already have its own sentencing range. Either way, it was 
hard to see why a breach of this particular type of court order should be treated as a criminal 
offence. 
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This difficulty also led to invocations of the logic of cumulative effect in the sentencing 
context. In the 2003 Braxton case, the court reduced the sentence passed for breach of an 
ASBO, suggesting that the sentencing court might have inappropriately taken into account 
the behaviour which had given rise to the ASBO, but upheld the principle that a custodial 
sentence should be given despite the relatively trivial nature of individual breaches. The court 
held that ‘what [the defendant] might consider as trivial in his case, because of the 
persistence of his conduct, is now treated seriously, specifically to protect the public’.22 Not 
only would multiple breaches of an ASBO amount cumulatively to a criminal offence, 
however trivial the actions occasioning the breaches might be; the persistence which could be 
inferred from the repeated breaches would be construed as an anti-social disposition, 
threatening the public and ultimately justifying imprisonment for public protection.  
 
In the Appeal Court’s 2005 ruling on the Tripp case the logic of cumulative effect was 
applied even more broadly, evoking the overall effect of the entire problem of anti-social 
behaviour as a reason for punitive sentencing in an individual case: ‘the anti-social behaviour 
order provisions were a response by Parliament to increasing concerns about the impact on 
the public of anti-social behaviour in its many forms. That concern must therefore be 
reflected by the courts in the sentences which it imposes for breaches’.23 The argument 
casually stated here is that a court passing sentence for the breach of a specific injunction, 
prohibiting actions likely to be precursors to renewed anti-social behaviour, should take into 
account public concern about the effect of anti-social behaviour as a whole. The Tripp ruling 
thus extends the doctrine of cumulative effect to the scale of society, and uses it as an 
invitation to exemplary sentencing. 
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The assumption in Braxton that repeated breaches of an ASBO manifested an anti-social 
disposition, and hence justified punishment, is clearly not generalisable given the vast range 
of prohibitions which might be imposed as part of an ASBO - and the range of otherwise 
legal activities which could consequently amount to the breach of an ASBO. The argument in 
Tripp for exemplary sentencing suffers for similar reasons: given the wide range of activities 
which could attract an ASBO - and the elusiveness of any prospect of security from 
anti-social behaviour - this was exemplary sentencing without any clear deterrent rationale. In 
MacDonald’s words, these rulings exemplify ‘a confused body of case law, as the courts have 
struggled to make sense of the maximum sentence for breaching an ASBO’.24 The court’s 
confusion seems to stem from a settled conviction of the seriousness and urgency of 
anti-social behaviour as a problem and the appropriateness of the ASBO as a tool for dealing 
with it, despite the obstacles which McCann had put in its way - obstacles which derived 
ultimately from the lack of any definition of anti-social behaviour, and from the civil/criminal 
hybridity designed into the ASBO. 
 
From regulative criminalisation to punitive regulation: the ASBI 
 
The government’s renewed attention to anti-social behaviour led to the creation of a new 
instrument which offered to resolve the contradictions which had beset the ASBO. The 
Housing Act 1996 had given social landlords the power to apply for injunctions prohibiting 
‘conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance or annoyance’ to residents or visitors, although 
injunctions could only be applied for on the grounds of actual or threatened violence.25 In 
2003 the Anti-Social Behaviour Act introduced the Anti-Social Behaviour Injunction (ASBI), 
designed to extend this injunctive power so as to address a broader range of anti-social 
behaviour in social housing. The ASBI could be applied for by local authorities and 
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registered social landlords without any consultation requirement. Like the earlier injunctions, 
ASBIs were to be applied for in the county court. 
 
The test for the anti-social behaviour to be controlled by an ASBI follows the wording of the 
Housing Act 1996, and is even more permissive than the wording of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998: an ASBI may be sought on the grounds that the individual in question ‘is engaging, 
has engaged or threatens to engage in’ conduct ‘capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to 
any person’.26 There is no requirement for sustained or malicious nuisance, or for any 
annoyance to have been caused - or indeed for any anti-social behaviour to have actually 
taken place, unless the threat of nuisance behaviour is understood as anti-social in itself. 
Unlike the ASBO, the ASBI was a wholly civil instrument rather than a civil/criminal hybrid; 
the capacious list of actually or potentially offensive behaviours which could justify an ASBI 
need only be proved to the civil standard. The ASBI was redrafted by the Police and Justice 
Act 2006; the main new provision was an increase in the flexibility with which the people 
putatively suffering nuisance or annoyance could be specified. Echoing the logic of the 
Potter judgment, victims of anti-social behaviour could now be specified individually, by a 
group description or by a reference to ‘persons generally’.27  
 
While the conditions which may give rise to an ASBI application are defined very broadly, 
the prohibitions of an ASBI are significantly narrower than those of an ASBO, being defined 
by reference to past conduct: ‘[a]n anti-social behaviour injunction prohibits the person in 
respect of whom it is granted from engaging in conduct to which this section applies.’28 It is 
also striking that the ASBI does not follow the preventive structure of the ASBO: where an 
ASBO imposes prohibitions so as to forestall anti-social behaviour in any form, an ASBI 
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responds to the nuisance caused by particular actions, and prohibits those actions. Breach of 
an ASBI was a contempt of court rather than a criminal offence in its own right. 
 
The ASBI was complemented by the provision in the Police Reform Act 2002 for ASBOs to 
be imposed by a court in conjunction with a criminal penalty or a conditional discharge. The 
Police Reform Act follows the wording of the Crime and Disorder Act in defining anti-social 
behaviour, although without the ‘reasonable in the circumstances’ stipulation.29 As with 
ASBOs on application, ASBOs on conviction must be necessary to prevent a recurrence of 
anti-social behaviour, and may contain any provisions thought necessary to do so.  
 
The ASBO on conviction became available at the end of 2002; the ASBI in July 2004. Both 
were enthusiastically taken up, rapidly outstripping the numbers of ASBOs on application; 
for details see Table 1. Data on ASBIs is only available for 2008, 2009 and 2010; in each of 
those years over 1100 ASBIs were granted in England30. Assuming that this trend was 
maintained, by 2013 ASBOs on application - the ASBO in its original form - only accounted 
for one in five of all ASB injunctions. 
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TABLE 131 
 
ASBOs on application, ASBOs on conviction and ASBIs granted in England and Wales, 
2002-13 
 






2002 426 1 427 
2003 687 663 1350 
2004 1208 2271 3479 
2005 1277 2845 4122 
2006 886 1819 2705 
2007 941 1358 2299 
2008 737 1290 2027 
2009 698 973 1671 
2010 696 968 1664 
2011 551 863 1414 
2012 484 845 1329 
2013 469 880 1349 
Total 9060 14776 23836 
 
 
The influences on the development of the ASBO (and related instruments) in this period had 
multiple authors, who had different - and in some cases opposed - objectives. However, two 
trends can be identified. One is a divergence between civil remedies and criminal penalties. 
The contrast between the ASBI (punishable only as contempt of court) and the ASBO on 
conviction (imposed in addition to a criminal sentence) suggests an incipient divergence 
between civil and criminal approaches to anti-social behaviour. 
 
At the same time, there was a consistent trend towards expanding the (already broad) scope 
of the behaviours covered by anti-social behaviour orders. The ASBI as redesigned was a 
flexible and easily-applied instrument for the repression of any activity with the capacity to 
annoy anyone, provided it was carried out in the vicinity of local authority housing. While the 
ASBO retained the more demanding test of likelihood to cause harassment, alarm or distress, 
here too the Potter judgment had introduced a high degree of flexibility. The effect of that 
judgment was twofold, lifting the burden of proof on two points: whether the behaviour at 
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issue had caused offence, or even had the potential to cause offence, to any identifiable 
individuals; and whether the behaviour of the defendant him- or herself had offended or had 
the potential to offend. An ASBO could be granted on application (or imposed on conviction) 
on the basis of common-sense assumptions about the offence likely to be caused to the local 
community in general, as the cumulative effect of unwanted contact with members of the 
defendant’s social group.  
 
While the ASBI and the ASBO on conviction both followed the original design of the ASBO 
in not including an exemption for unintentional or inadvertent behaviour, the newer measures 
both also omitted any ‘reasonable in the circumstances’ clause. This may have reflected the 
consensus which had developed since 1998 - and in particular since the Day Count - as to 
which activities should be considered anti-social. However, the effect was to leave 
respondents with no recourse against inappropriate ASBI/ASBO applications other than 
relying on the good sense of the court. In short, the drift away from the experiment of a 
civil/criminal hybrid was accompanied by an expansion of the scope of the ASBO and ASBI 
and a whittling-away of remaining safeguards. 
 
The ASBO had been designed as an instrument of pre-emptive and potentially punitive 
behaviour regulation. The intention was to eliminate anti-social behaviour by applying 
tailored regulation to the activities of the individuals responsible for it, enforced by the threat 
of criminal sanctions. Governed by an individualised behavioural regime, an ASBO recipient 
would no longer have the opportunity to engage in anti-social behaviour. In Michael’s words, 
‘Orders will succeed when they make punishment unnecessary for the people on whom they 
are imposed. Those people will no longer be a nuisance to the public’.32 The assumption that 
a coercive behavioural regime was appropriate for people causing a nuisance to the public - 
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and that those people could be reliably identified - was further underlined by the criminal 
sanction for breach of an ASBO; this was justified on the grounds that breach would 
represent defiance of the authority of the ASBO regime, which itself would deserve 
punishment. 
 
By 2005 the regulatory landscape looked very different. The ASBI in particular harks back to 
the origins of anti-social behaviour legislation, both in its social housing setting and in the 
focus on ‘nuisance or annoyance’ rather than ‘harassment, alarm or distress’; as such, the 
scope of behaviours to be controlled is even broader than in the case of the ASBO. At the 
same time, the ASBI abandons the preventive logic of the ASBO. The ASBO imposes a 
tailored set of regulations designed to channel the recipient’s behaviour away from occasions 
for anti-social behaviour, backed by the authority of the criminal law. The ASBI serves 
notice on the recipient that their behaviour has caused annoyance, and warns them not to 
repeat the offending activities. The recipient’s behaviour is only regulated to the extent that 
they are required to refrain from identified nuisance behaviours; breach will lead to adverse 
consequences, possibly extending to eviction, but will not lead to a criminal record. The 
ASBO regulates innocuous activities so as to forestall nuisance behaviour, the regulation 
being backed by the threat of criminalisation; compliance with an ASBO steers the 
recipient’s activities into a course where anti-social behaviour is not possible. The ASBI 
imposes regulations directly prohibiting undesirable activities; compliance with an ASBI 
represents a guided but genuine choice to desist from nuisance behaviour. The ASBI deters; 
the ASBO incapacitates. 
 
The wholly civil status of the ASBI - making breach contempt of court rather than a criminal 
offence - gives it a number of benefits. Courts have flexibility in sentencing for contempt; 
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although brief custodial sentences for the contempt represented by the breach of an ASBI are 
far from unknown, custodial sentencing is not mandatory. Contempt proceedings also have 
the symbolic or communicative merit of not giving the contemnor a criminal record. (By 
contrast, government guidelines in 2006 stressed that breach of an ASBO should not be 
treated as ‘just another minor offence’.33) ASBIs are applied for in the county court rather 
than a magistrate’s court, which - it can be assumed - brings a higher level of legal expertise 
to bear on applications. It is noteworthy that Hoffman and MacDonald drew on these features 
of the ASBI in their proposal for a ‘civilized’ ASBO, although they envisaged the ASBI 
continuing in operation for social housing management purposes.34 
 
Beyond the ASBO - back to the future? 
 
In 2014, after lengthy consultation, the Coalition government introduced replacements for the 
ASBO and ASBI. A new ASB Injunction - initially referred to as a ‘Crime Prevention 
Injunction’35 and later as an Injunction to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance (IPNA)36 - 
replaces both the ASBO on application and the ASBI; a Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO) 
replaces the ASBO on conviction. The ASB Injunction37 came into force in March 2015. In 
its details, the Injunction more closely resembles its namesake the ASBI than it does the 
ASBO. It is a purely civil order, applied for in a county court, and with breach treated as 
contempt of court. The ASB Injunction can be applied for by a range of bodies. In an 
oddly-worded and permissive provision, the applicant is required to inform ‘any ... body or 
individual the applicant thinks appropriate’ before making the application; the only binding 
requirement is for consultation with the local Youth Offending Team in cases where the 
application is in respect of a minor38. There is a twofold test: ‘that the court is satisfied, on 
the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage in anti-
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social behaviour’ and that ‘the court considers it just and convenient to grant the 
injunction’.39 The first test echoes the relevant provisions for the ASBI; it is not clear what 
weight the second test would have in practice. 
 
Reflecting the different definitions used in the Crime and Disorder Act and the Anti-social 
Behaviour Act, anti-social behaviour is in three ways: as ‘conduct that has caused, or is likely 
to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person’; as ‘conduct capable of causing 
nuisance or annoyance to a person in relation to that person's occupation of residential 
premise’; and as ‘conduct capable of causing housing-related nuisance or annoyance to any 
person’. The Act goes on to specify that the second of these formulations only obtains where 
an injunction is being applied for by a housing provider, a local authority or a chief officer of 
police, while the reference to ‘housing-related’ nuisance in the third formulation is to be read 
as relating to social housing40. These provisions, together with the nuisance-based definition 
of anti-social behaviour, are clearly designed to incorporate the functionality of the ASBI into 
the new injunction. Unlike the ASBI, however, the new Injunction is ‘tenure-neutral’ by 
design; it ‘could be used to deal with any anti-social individual [sic], regardless of where they 
lived’.41 Unlike the ASBI - but like the ASBO - it may also be applied for in respect of a 
minor (aged ten years or above). The terms of the ASB Injunction may include any 
‘prohibitions or requirements that assist in the prevention of future anti-social behaviour’.42 
The lack of reference to necessity in this formulation is striking, suggesting an even more 
permissive approach to the formulation of orders than has applied under the ASBO. This 
broad preventive approach is augmented further by the scope to impose positive 
requirements, hitherto only available for young offenders in the form of Individual Support 
Orders (introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003).43 
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The CBO retains the ‘harassment, alarm or distress’ wording: an order may be made if ‘the 
court is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the offender has engaged in behaviour that 
caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person.’.44 As with the 
Injunction, there is no requirement that the potential or actual victim of anti-social behaviour 
should be of another household than the offender. Evidence to support the imposition of a 
CBO may include evidence that would have been inadmissible in the case in which the 
individual was convicted, e.g. hearsay45. Breach of a CBO is defined as a criminal offence46. 
Like the Injunction, the CBO may include positive requirements as well as prohibitions47.  
 
When first announced, the new measures were accompanied by proposals for a ‘Community 
Trigger’, whereby local authorities, police, healthcare providers and social landlords would 
be under a statutory duty to respond to repeated complaints of anti-social behaviour. Draft 
proposals envisaged that the threshold for the ‘trigger’ could be defined in terms of either 
multiple complaints or multiple complainants: the requirement would be that local agencies 
had received five complaints from separate households about a single issue, or three 
complaints from a single individual, without taking any action.48 The 2004 report of the 
European Commissioner for Human Rights had expressed concern that ASBOs ‘look rather 
like personalised penal codes’ and could impose selective criminalisation on ‘individuals who 
have incurred the wrath of the community’.49 While the ASB Injunction would not 
criminalise, the Community Trigger seems designed to articulate and focus ‘the wrath of the 
community’ without the mediating influence of the police or local authority.  
 
Following a mixed response to the Community Trigger proposal, the government proposed to 
devolve the detailed implementation of the ‘trigger’ to local authorities, which would be 
required to define and publicise the processes and criteria they used.50 Between June 2012 
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and Apriil 2013, pilots of the Community Trigger were carried out in five local authority 
areas: Manchester, Brighton and Hove, the London borough of Richmond upon Thames, 
Boston and West Lindsey. Table 2 sums up the different approaches taken by the four pilot 
areas’ Web sites. 
 
TABLE 251 
Community Trigger pilots: definitions and thresholds used 
 
   Complaints: Complainants: 
 Type of incident ‘Hate crime’ cited? number in period number 
Manchester 
Anti-social behaviour 
or hate crime 
Supporting text 3 Six months 5 
Richmond  
upon Thames 
Anti-social behaviour Prompted 3 Six months 5 
Boston Anti-social behaviour No 3 Twelve months 3 




or hate crime 
In definition 1 Not specified 2 
 
 
Manchester and Richmond broadly followed the Home Office recommendations in defining 
both the ‘multiple complaint’ and ‘multiple complainants’ scenarios, both imposing a 
six-month time window within which the multiple complaints must have been made. The 
paired Lincolnshire trials of Boston and West Lindsey used a longer time window; Boston 
required three complainants rather than five, while West Lindsey had no provision for 
‘multiple complainant’ incidents. The most expansive approach was taken by the Brighton 
and Hove pilot: this required only that more than one household have been affected, or that 
one complaint have been made in the past, with no time window specified. 
 
Given the undefined nature of anti-social behaviour and the potentially infinite range of 
complaints which this initiative could elicit, it is also noteworthy that four of the five pilot 
areas positioned the initiative as a way of addressing hate crime and hate incidents as well as 
anti-social behaviour. Again, Brighton and Hove’s pilot strays furthest from the original 
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design of the Trigger, specifying that it is to be used to address inadequate responses to 
‘anti-social behaviour or a hate incident / crime’.52 While the other four areas’ Web sites all 
focus on anti-social behaviour, all except Boston prompt users, more or less prominently, to 
consider hate crime as a concern. This suggests a degree of overlap with the campaign to 
increase reporting of hate crime launched in 2012 by the Home Office and the Association of 
Chief Police Officers.53 Given that the Home Office campaign aims to encourage non-
reporting victims to make a report, while the Community Trigger is predicated on failure to 
respond to an initial report, the overlap is potentially problematic. Perhaps reflecting this 
division of purpose, the Manchester pilot site specifies that in the case of hate crime, only one 
complaint in the past six months is required. The Richmond pilot site offers less clarity: 
although users are prompted categorise the issue being reported as ‘Anti-social behaviour’, 
‘Hate incidents or crimes’, both or neither, the front page of the site carries a prominent 
reminder that ‘The Community Trigger can not be used to report general acts of crime, 
including hate crime.’54 However, the evidence from the Community Trigger trials does not 
demonstrate widespread confusion on this point. 
 
Indeed, perhaps the main fact demonstrated by the Community Trigger trials was their own 
limited impact, which in turn suggests that there was limited suppressed demand for ASB 
case reviews. Across the five pilots only 26 ‘triggers’ were received; of these 15 met the 
specific local authority’s threshold for a case review and six led to action being taken. Two of 
the five pilot areas - both urban - accounted for eighteen of the 26 activations, and for five of 
the six cases on which action were taken55. While the ‘trigger’ mechanism was duly enacted 
into law, it is perhaps symptomatic that it appears under the anodyne heading of ‘Review of 
response to complaints’56. 
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The ASB Injunction and CBO are perhaps best considered as developments on the ASBI and 
the ASBO on conviction respectively, superseding the ASBO on application - which is to 
say, the ASBO as originally drafted. Assessing the new instruments with reference to the 
three key features of the ASBO identified earlier, we can identify one break and two 
continuities. The break is with the civil/criminal hybridity of the ASBO - a feature whose 
utility had been impaired by the McCann judgment. The CBO, like the ASBO on conviction, 
is a supplement to a criminal sentence - a kind of behavioural surcharge on prosecutorial 
request. By contrast, the ASB Injunction, like the ASBI, is a wholly civil instrument of 
behaviour regulation. The Labour government’s insistence on backing civil behaviour 
regulation with criminal penalties, the better to ‘send [a] clear message’57 of society’s 
condemnation of anti-social behaviour, has disappeared. 
 
The preventive focus of the ASBO is reproduced in the new measures, however, with 
conditions aimed at forestalling anti-social behaviour. The ASBI had departed from this 
logic, prohibiting anti-social behaviours directly and hence offering the respondent the choice 
of not behaving anti-socially. The new measures return to the incapacitatory approach of the 
ASBO, made potentially still more intrusive by the admission of additional conditions that 
may be judged to ‘assist’ in the prevention of anti-social behaviour. 
 
The lack of definition associated with both anti-social behaviour and the ASBO, lastly, is not 
only maintained but entrenched. Like both the ASBO and ASBI, the new measures do not 
have an intentionality test or any stipulation that offence should actually have been caused. 
To obtain a CBO, ‘behaviour that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ 
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For an ASB Injunction, by contrast, the conduct to 
be addressed need only be ‘capable of causing nuisance or annoyance’, and needs only to be 
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proved on the balance of probabilities. Hoffman and MacDonald’s proposed civil ASBO 
would have been obtainable only by Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, giving local 
authorities a central role. The ASB Injunction is to be obtainable by a wider range of agencies 
than the ASBO and with minimal consultation requirements. Both ASB Injunction and CBO 
also carry the possibility of imposing positive conditions as well as prohibitions. 
 
The predictable outcome of the replacement of ASBO and ASBI by ASB Injunction and 
CBO will be that a wider range of people will be subjected more capriciously to more varied 
behavioural constraints. The fact that the breach of an ASB Injunction will be a contempt of 
court rather than a criminal offence is only a partial break with the logic of the ASBO; 
although not backed with criminal sanctions, the ASB Injunction will still aim to control 
behaviour through selective and pre-emptive prohibition, and a custodial sentence will 
remain a possibility on breach. Anti-social behaviour is still conceived as a protean menace 
which can only be managed through pre-emptive behaviour regulation, forcibly schooling 




Anti-social behaviour, as the Labour governments of 1997-2010 defined it, could take a 
plethora of forms, but represented a single social problem. Anti-social behaviour blighted 
lives and had been ignored for too long; individual instances might be trivial, but all needed 
to be dealt with decisively and urgently. The ASBO, the instrument designed for the job, was 
designed to impose preventive conditions, banning innocuous precursor activities on an 
individual basis; those held to have behaved anti-socially would be forcibly schooled in 
patterns of behaviour which would not permit anti-social behaviour to arise. Engaging in any 
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of the forbidden activities was a criminal offence; the sentence this would attract would send 
a message both to the offender and more widely, educating the community in the importance 
of respecting society’s disapproval of anti-social behaviour. 
 
The troubled history of the ASBO as a civil/criminal hybrid, and the Coalition’s declared 
intention of replacing it, raised hopes of a new approach to anti-social behaviour in general; 
the focussed and wholly-civil approach of the ASBI suggested a model. However, when 
Theresa May laid a written statement before the House of Commons announcing the 
proposed replacements for the ASBO, her language was familiar: ‘The term “anti-social 
behaviour” masks a range of nuisance, disorder and crime which affects people’s lives on a 
daily basis: from vandalism and graffiti; to drunk or rowdy behaviour in public; to 
intimidation and harassment. All have huge impacts on the lives of millions of people in this 
country. None is acceptable.’58 
 
The ASB Injunction has shed the criminal element of the ASBO; as a result, there is no 
suggestion that breaching an ASB Injunction would constitute ‘mess[ing] with the courts’,59 
or that the sentence for a breach should reflect ‘the impact on the public of anti-social 
behaviour in its many forms’.60 But it may be premature to argue that this change represents a 
new model of anti-social behaviour and its control, as distinct from a tactical retreat forced by 
McCann and subsequent judgments. The refusal to define anti-social behaviour, the rhetorical 
recourse to ideas of cumulative effect and the paradoxical demand for urgent and draconian 
action to prevent minor and non-criminal actions: all remain in place. These features are now 
backed by a more flexible and powerful toolkit for behaviour regulation, responsive to a 
wider range of agencies and to the general public. Graffiti, drunkenness, rowdiness: all these 
things have ‘huge impacts’ on ‘millions’; ‘[n]one is acceptable’. Anti-social behaviour 
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remains a high political priority, to be addressed as a matter of urgency and by any means 
necessary, however trivial a guise any given incident may wear. 
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